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Modal properties: are properties that are not attributed actually to an object, but are attributed in a possible world. A modal property is e.g. the property of being happier under other circumstances. The question is whether an object in the actual world must have a certain quality in order to have different properties in another world. See also modal logic, modal realism, possible worlds, centered worlds, contingency, possibility, necessity, properties, extensionality._____________Annotation: The above characterizations of concepts are neither definitions nor exhausting presentations of problems related to them. Instead, they are intended to give a short introduction to the contributions below. – Lexicon of Arguments. | |||
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Hilary Putnam on Modal Properties - Dictionary of Arguments
I (g) 189 Nature/essence/Kripke: e.g. statue: the statue and the piece of clay are two items. The fact that the piece of clay has a modal property, namely, "to be a thing that might have been spherical" is missing in the statue. VsKripke: that sounds initially odd: e.g. when I put the statue on the scale, do I measure then two objects? E.g. it is equally strange to say that a human being is not identical with the aggregation of its molecules. Intrinsic Properties/Putnam: e.g. suppose, there are "intrinsic connections" to my thoughts to external objects: then there is perhaps a spacetime region in my brain with quantity-theoretical connections with an abstract object which includes some external objects. >Intrinsic, >Extrinsic. Then this spacetime region will have a similar quantity-theoretical connection with other abstract entities that contain other external objects. Then the materialist can certainly say that my "thoughts" include certain external objects intrinsically, by identifying these thoughts with a certain abstract entity. Problem: if this identification should be a train of reality itself, then there must be real essences in the world in a sense that the set theory cannot explain. Nature/essential properties/PutnamVsKripke: Kripke's ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot serve to justify it. >Essentialism, >Essence. I (g) 190 Term/possible world/Putnam: modern semantics: functions about possible worlds represent terms, e.g. the term "this statue" unequals the phrase "this piece of clay". PutnamVsPossible Worlds: question: in the actual world, is there an object to which one of these terms significantly and the other only accidentally applies to? Possible worlds provide too many objects. PutnamVsKripke/PutnamVsEssentialism: Kripke's ontology presupposes essentialism, it cannot justify it. Modal properties are not part of the materialistic means of the world but Kripke individuated objects by their modal properties. Essential Properties/Putnam: I have not shifted them into "parallel worlds" but instead into possible states of the actual world (other liquid than H20 water) which is insofar essentialist that we have thus discovered the nature of water. We just say water should not be anything else (intention). That is our use and not "built into the world" (intrinsic, Kripke ditto). VsMaterialism: this does not help the semantic reading because it presupposes reference (materialism wants to win reference from "intrinsic" causal relationship). >Materialism, >Reference, >intrinsic._____________Explanation of symbols: Roman numerals indicate the source, arabic numerals indicate the page number. The corresponding books are indicated on the right hand side. ((s)…): Comment by the sender of the contribution. Translations: Dictionary of Arguments The note [Concept/Author], [Author1]Vs[Author2] or [Author]Vs[term] resp. "problem:"/"solution:", "old:"/"new:" and "thesis:" is an addition from the Dictionary of Arguments. If a German edition is specified, the page numbers refer to this edition. |
Putnam I Hilary Putnam Von einem Realistischen Standpunkt In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Frankfurt 1993 Putnam I (a) Hilary Putnam Explanation and Reference, In: Glenn Pearce & Patrick Maynard (eds.), Conceptual Change. D. Reidel. pp. 196--214 (1973) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (b) Hilary Putnam Language and Reality, in: Mind, Language and Reality: Philosophical Papers, Volume 2. Cambridge University Press. pp. 272-90 (1995 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (c) Hilary Putnam What is Realism? in: Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1975):pp. 177 - 194. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (d) Hilary Putnam Models and Reality, Journal of Symbolic Logic 45 (3), 1980:pp. 464-482. In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (e) Hilary Putnam Reference and Truth In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (f) Hilary Putnam How to Be an Internal Realist and a Transcendental Idealist (at the Same Time) in: R. Haller/W. Grassl (eds): Sprache, Logik und Philosophie, Akten des 4. Internationalen Wittgenstein-Symposiums, 1979 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (g) Hilary Putnam Why there isn’t a ready-made world, Synthese 51 (2):205--228 (1982) In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (h) Hilary Putnam Pourqui les Philosophes? in: A: Jacob (ed.) L’Encyclopédie PHilosophieque Universelle, Paris 1986 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (i) Hilary Putnam Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam I (k) Hilary Putnam "Irrealism and Deconstruction", 6. Giford Lecture, St. Andrews 1990, in: H. Putnam, Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992, pp. 108-133 In Von einem realistischen Standpunkt, Vincent C. Müller, Reinbek 1993 Putnam II Hilary Putnam Representation and Reality, Cambridge/MA 1988 German Edition: Repräsentation und Realität Frankfurt 1999 Putnam III Hilary Putnam Renewing Philosophy (The Gifford Lectures), Cambridge/MA 1992 German Edition: Für eine Erneuerung der Philosophie Stuttgart 1997 Putnam IV Hilary Putnam "Minds and Machines", in: Sidney Hook (ed.) Dimensions of Mind, New York 1960, pp. 138-164 In Künstliche Intelligenz, Walther Ch. Zimmerli/Stefan Wolf, Stuttgart 1994 Putnam V Hilary Putnam Reason, Truth and History, Cambridge/MA 1981 German Edition: Vernunft, Wahrheit und Geschichte Frankfurt 1990 Putnam VI Hilary Putnam "Realism and Reason", Proceedings of the American Philosophical Association (1976) pp. 483-98 In Truth and Meaning, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 Putnam VII Hilary Putnam "A Defense of Internal Realism" in: James Conant (ed.)Realism with a Human Face, Cambridge/MA 1990 pp. 30-43 In Theories of Truth, Paul Horwich, Aldershot 1994 SocPut I Robert D. Putnam Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community New York 2000 |